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This study examines whether risk asset exposure affects the financial performance of commercial banks in Cameroon, a bank-dominated economy of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Risk asset exposure is measured by lending intensity (the loan-to-deposit ratio) and credit expansion (annual loan growth), and performance by return on assets (ROA). The data form a balanced panel of ten commercial banks over 2014–2024, compiled from the prudential reporting system of the Central African Banking Commission (COBAC) as published by Cameroon's National Economic and Financial Committee. Bank fixed-effects regressions with bank-clustered standard errors are complemented by a wild-cluster bootstrap suited to few clusters, Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, lagged regressors, panel Granger non-causality tests and a within–between (Mundlak) decomposition that separates changes in a bank's own exposure from persistent differences between banks. The main findings are that (i) neither lending intensity nor credit expansion is significantly associated with profitability in any specification (bootstrap p = 0.81 and 0.30), and the confidence intervals exclude effects larger than about one percentage point of ROA; (ii) lending intensity is unrelated to profitability both within banks over time and between banks (between-effect bootstrap p = 0.88); and (iii) the COVID-19 years of 2020–2021 were associated with ROA about 0.70 percentage points lower (bootstrap p = 0.009). The results indicate a limited role for lending exposure, while significant bank fixed effects and the COVID-19 coefficient point to persistent bank heterogeneity and common systemic shocks. Because the sample comprises ten banks under a single regulator, the findings should be interpreted with caution.

This paper examines how uninsured deposits influence credit union funding and whether private excess deposit insurance alters the stability, pricing, and lending capacity of uninsured deposits — deposits that exceed the federal deposit insurance limit. Using U.S. credit union Call Report data from 1995–2022, we exploit variation across institution size, insurance regime, and participation in optional private excess deposit insurance.  We distinguish between pre-crisis (1995–2007) and post-crisis (2009–2022) periods surrounding the 2008 expansion of federal insurance limits.  We document pronounced heterogeneity across the size distribution.  For small credit unions, uninsured deposits are limited in scale and are associated with lower loan intensity.  In contrast, uninsured deposits play a central funding role for large credit unions, which account for 94% of industry assets and 97% of uninsured deposits. For these institutions, uninsured deposits support lending and command higher funding costs — effects that are significantly moderated by excess deposit insurance, reducing funding costs by approximately 27 basis points during the pre-crisis period.  Following 2008, excess insurance participation declines among large institutions but increases modestly among small firms.  Overall, excess deposit insurance functions as a partial substitute for federal coverage, stabilizing uninsured funding without increasing delinquency rates — evidence against moral hazard.

This paper focuses on a classic policy trade-off by unraveling the role of financial deregulation in driving financial stability and exploring how the role of regulatory quality can affect this relationship. To this end, this study uses a balanced panel dataset of 73 countries across a period of ten years starting from 2014. The empirical specification utilizes a two-step System GMM approach, accounting for both endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity issues, and persistence in financial stability. Specifically, financial stability is measured by non-performing loans (NPLs), which represent the level of risk exposure of national banking sectors. The findings reveal that financial freedom leads to higher level of financial instability, proving theoretical predictions of the excessive risk-taking behavior of lending institutions encouraged with financial deregulation. Furthermore, the interaction term between financial freedom and regulatory quality is statistically significant, suggesting that financial deregulation can be compensated by the quality of regulatory environment. The role of the GDP per capita variable used for stabilizing the findings is significant as it represents the resilience of more developed economies. The implications of the results are complex. In a more institutional context, this finding suggests that financial stability is not a direct function of financial freedom but is conditional on institutional capability. Hence, high regulatory quality can mitigate the instability caused by financial freedom, thereby enabling a balanced approach.