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Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1987–2011, we find robust evidence that the issuance of seasoned equity is associated with abnormally high future stock price crash risk. The association between seasoned equity offerings and crash risk is stronger among offerings that involve the sale of secondary shares (existing shares sold by insiders or large blockholders). We also find that recent seasoned equity issuers are far less likely to experience sudden positive price jumps relative to firms that have not recently issued equity. Our findings of elevated crash risk and diminished jump risk, when taken together, are consistent with a heightened propensity for firms to hoard bad news but not good news when issuing equity.

The purpose of the study was to determine the determinants of the firms' capital structure concerning their maximum financial performance. To reach this aim, the data of the financial statements firms of Indonesia were used. As the first method, a Pearson correlation matrix was applied to determine a statistically significant correlation between capital structure indicator (debt-to-assets ratio) and financial performance and ownership of the firms. The analysis used the data panel multiple regression model to assess the effect of these independent and controlling variables on leverage. Some findings are that profitability has positive (ROA) and negative (ROE) effect on leverage. MBV and tangibility do not affect the capital structure, and firm size negatively impacts on it. In this panel analysis, it was confirmed that the managerial and institutional ownership impact on leverage negatively and positively, respectively. By decreasing the sales growth, the debt ratio entity rises, or they have a negative relationship. Based on these findings, it can be stated that financial performances influenced the capital structure.

We document frequency distribution of 4315 two-party, non-equity alliances undertaken by the U.S. based firms between 1986 and 2015 in 11industries and find that on an aggregate basis, the firms which form multiple alliances based on the exploitation motive are as likely to enter into alliance as the firms that enter into multiple alliances based on the exploration motive. However, we find strong evidence that the firms that enter into alliances on three or more occasions are driven by the exploration motive while, the firms that enter into alliances one and one or two times are driven by the exploitation motive.  The average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for all of the three subsamples of firms that undertook one, one or two, and three or more alliances during the time period for this study are all positive but exhibit a declining trend.  Firms that are larger in terms of total assets engage more frequently in alliances than smaller firms.  Returns to firms that enter into three or more alliances are sensitive to the leverage employed and the likelihood of bankruptcy whereas returns to firms that enter into only one or one or two alliances are affected significantly by the considerations of competitive forces.