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Trust in public institutions has become a central governance concern in Southern Africa, where post-apartheid constitutional reforms were intended to strengthen accountability, protect rights, and consolidate democratic rule. South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Malawi offer contrasting trajectories of reform and institution-building, shaped by varying political settlements, judicial independence, and citizen expectations. Despite formal advances such as enhanced human-rights protections, electoral reforms, and new accountability institutions, survey evidence suggests declining public confidence in core state structures. This paper examines how constitutional reform episodes influence trust in institutions using a country-year panel from 2000–2020, drawing on Afrobarometer, V-Dem, and the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. A difference-in-differences design identifies changes in institutional trust following reform events, while a synthetic control approach provides additional insight for early adopters. The analysis indicates that reforms improve trust only where rule-of-law institutions function credibly and where reform implementation is consistent. The results highlight the importance of judicial performance, electoral management capacity, and local governance quality. The paper concludes that future reforms must prioritise implementation and institutional coherence to restore trust across Southern Africa’s democracies.

This paper examines Kaldor’s New War Thesis and locates it in the context of Central and West Africa where a plethora of burgeoning evidence provides ground for its validation. Kaldor notes that New Wars, as she puts it, occur in the era of globalization. The core argument fronted by Kaldor is that New Wars are different from ‘Old Wars’. The paper is thus founded on this central locus and discussions advanced in here are crystalized around this distinction. Drawing evidence from countries located in West and Central Africa, the paper argues the case for the validity of this theory to the African context. It is also fair to point out that Kaldor’s New War Theory does not escape the anxious thrusts of criticism. In spite of this welcome critiques – it is quite evident that it is applicable to the African context and this also erases most of the common arguments that such theories are highly Western or foreign and thus have limited applicability to the African context. The paper provides one of the contemporary contextualization’s of this theory and aims to form a basis to build up more discussions on why Africa still reels from wars and conflicts and the new perspectives that are now applicable. Finally, it is hoped that this discussion provides more documentation and evidence that can support better policy, evidence-based decision making and advance regional peace and security in West and Central Africa and to the rest of the continent.

This paper critically examines the consolidation of executive power in Africa through constitutional amendments, often referred to as “constitutional coups,” and its correlation with the resurgence of military interventions. The study’s objective is to explore how the removal of presidential term limits, electoral law manipulation, and similar structural changes contribute to the erosion of democratic norms, institutional accountability, and political stability. Using a conceptual and theoretical analysis grounded in recent case studies, the paper demonstrates how these tactics entrench aging political elites and deepen systemic challenges such as corruption, poverty, and tribalism. It highlights how gerontocracy and ethnically skewed political appointments generate exclusionary governance structures that monopolize key institutions, including the judiciary, legislature, and the military, within dominant ethnic factions, thereby intensifying political marginalisation and social unrest. The paper argues that when peaceful mechanisms for political transition are closed off by such legal manipulations, the likelihood of mass protest and military coups increases. As a policy response, the study recommends the codification of African Union norms on constitutional amendment procedures, the enforcement of term limits, and the strengthening of continental early warning systems. These measures are vital for restoring institutional checks, deterring authoritarian entrenchment, and safeguarding democratic governance across the continent. The paper thus contributes to the discourse on constitutionalism and political accountability in Africa by offering practical, policy-relevant strategies for reform.

Trust in public institutions has become a central governance concern in Southern Africa, where post-apartheid constitutional reforms were intended to strengthen accountability, protect rights, and consolidate democratic rule. South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Malawi offer contrasting trajectories of reform and institution-building, shaped by varying political settlements, judicial independence, and citizen expectations. Despite formal advances such as enhanced human-rights protections, electoral reforms, and new accountability institutions, survey evidence suggests declining public confidence in core state structures. This paper examines how constitutional reform episodes influence trust in institutions using a country-year panel from 2000–2020, drawing on Afrobarometer, V-Dem, and the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. A difference-in-differences design identifies changes in institutional trust following reform events, while a synthetic control approach provides additional insight for early adopters. The analysis indicates that reforms improve trust only where rule-of-law institutions function credibly and where reform implementation is consistent. The results highlight the importance of judicial performance, electoral management capacity, and local governance quality. The paper concludes that future reforms must prioritise implementation and institutional coherence to restore trust across Southern Africa’s democracies.

This paper examines Kaldor’s New War Thesis and locates it in the context of Central and West Africa where a plethora of burgeoning evidence provides ground for its validation. Kaldor notes that New Wars, as she puts it, occur in the era of globalization. The core argument fronted by Kaldor is that New Wars are different from ‘Old Wars’. The paper is thus founded on this central locus and discussions advanced in here are crystalized around this distinction. Drawing evidence from countries located in West and Central Africa, the paper argues the case for the validity of this theory to the African context. It is also fair to point out that Kaldor’s New War Theory does not escape the anxious thrusts of criticism. In spite of this welcome critiques – it is quite evident that it is applicable to the African context and this also erases most of the common arguments that such theories are highly Western or foreign and thus have limited applicability to the African context. The paper provides one of the contemporary contextualization’s of this theory and aims to form a basis to build up more discussions on why Africa still reels from wars and conflicts and the new perspectives that are now applicable. Finally, it is hoped that this discussion provides more documentation and evidence that can support better policy, evidence-based decision making and advance regional peace and security in West and Central Africa and to the rest of the continent.

This paper critically examines the consolidation of executive power in Africa through constitutional amendments, often referred to as “constitutional coups,” and its correlation with the resurgence of military interventions. The study’s objective is to explore how the removal of presidential term limits, electoral law manipulation, and similar structural changes contribute to the erosion of democratic norms, institutional accountability, and political stability. Using a conceptual and theoretical analysis grounded in recent case studies, the paper demonstrates how these tactics entrench aging political elites and deepen systemic challenges such as corruption, poverty, and tribalism. It highlights how gerontocracy and ethnically skewed political appointments generate exclusionary governance structures that monopolize key institutions, including the judiciary, legislature, and the military, within dominant ethnic factions, thereby intensifying political marginalisation and social unrest. The paper argues that when peaceful mechanisms for political transition are closed off by such legal manipulations, the likelihood of mass protest and military coups increases. As a policy response, the study recommends the codification of African Union norms on constitutional amendment procedures, the enforcement of term limits, and the strengthening of continental early warning systems. These measures are vital for restoring institutional checks, deterring authoritarian entrenchment, and safeguarding democratic governance across the continent. The paper thus contributes to the discourse on constitutionalism and political accountability in Africa by offering practical, policy-relevant strategies for reform.