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This study analyzes the effect of capital structure on the performance of telecommunications firms. The firm performance is measured by return on assets while capital structure is proxied with the ratio of debt total assets. Data of telecommunication firm in 62 countries period of year 2010-2020 proceed with a dynamic data panel regression model using the generalized method of moment approach. The empirical results indicated that capital structure of telecommunication firm has significantly impact to the firm performance in developed and developing countries as well as in integrated and wireless telecommunication firms.  The other factors that effect on firm performance are firm size and growth. The novelty of this study lies in the scope of analyses that cover world-wide telecommunication industry based on demographic group (developed and developing countries) and main businesses (integrated and wireless telecommunication).

This study aims to determine the effect of debt policy and profitability on firm value moderated by corporate governance. This study uses secondary data on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for a five-year period from 2016 to 2020. The sample selection used the purposive sampling method in order to obtain a total of 195 samples that met the specified criteria. This research was tested using Moderated Regression Analysis. The results of this study provide evidence that debt and profitability policies have a positive effect on firm value.  Corporate is unable to influence the policy of debt to the value of the company, meaning that corporate governance cannot parse the information asymmetry caused by the policy of debt to corporate value and corporate governance strengthen the influence of profitability on firm value, which means that with the increasing corporate governance can strengthen the effect of profitability on firm value.

Previous study finds that the firms with inferior growth options tend to issue callable bonds. Typically, these firms are characterized by stock underperformance. Previous study also finds that the floating rate as a superior alternative to the call provision, which is restrictive, when the interest rates are likely to fall. We study the long-term stock performance of floating rate notes (FRNs) issuing firms, issued when the interest rates are high. Stock overperformance would suggest floating rate as a preferred choice by the firms with high growth options rather the call option. We find that the FRNs are generally investment grade with extremely rare presence of a call option. We perform the analysis using Buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the proxy for the long-term stock overperformance/underperformance. A sample of floating rate notes issued (1654) from 1992 to 2007, a period of high interest rates, reveals significant overperformance by the floating rate notes issuing firms in the high-rate paradigm. High growth firms, in the high-rate environment, significantly benefit from the floating rate provision which is less restrictive and less costly than the call option, which typically provides call protection period and pays a call premium. Floating rate provision better mitigates the interest rate risk for the firms in the high-rate environment. We find that the smaller, high growth, higher leverage, less profitable firms with greater agency issues benefit more from issuing FRNs in the high-rate environment. Our study has relevance to the stock portfolio construction and performance. We also perform a comparative analysis using the sample of floating rate notes issued (270) during 2008 to 2018, a period of low interest rates, and find stock underperformance. The implications are that the call option likely is a better choice for the firm since the firm preserves the right to forego exercising the option.

To maximize value, companies must adopt the optimal financial structure. However, identifying this structure is not easy. Literature does not give satisfactory results. To remedy this difficulty, we have sought the optimal financial structure applicable to all companies. Thus, in a new approach by the cost of capital, using modelling, we identify an optimal financial structure model that can neutralize the risk of default of debt:   D/K  with t ? i but t > i.

This study compares Corporate Governance (CG) between Hungary and Indonesia and analyzes the causality between CG and financial performance in both countries. CG proxy is the ownership structure. In the monitoring function, CG will improve the company's performance. The company's performance, on the other hand, can affect the ownership structure as one of the markets for corporate control in the CG mechanism. The causality test will inform whether the monitoring or market for corporate control is implemented as a CG mechanism. This study uses the Granger causality test to analyze the bi-causality between CG and financial performance. The sample consists of companies listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSX) and the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The results showed that only two pairs of bi-causality relationships (out of six pairs) occurred in the BSE sample companies, and there were three pairs of bi-causality relationships (out of nine pairs) in the IDX sample companies. This research contributes to the relationship between ownership and firm performance based on agency problems from the perspective of the monitoring function and the market for firm control.

Previous study finds that the firms with inferior growth options tend to issue callable bonds. Typically, these firms are characterized by stock underperformance. Previous study also finds that the floating rate as a superior alternative to the call provision, which is restrictive, when the interest rates are likely to fall. We study the long-term stock performance of floating rate notes (FRNs) issuing firms, issued when the interest rates are high. Stock overperformance would suggest floating rate as a preferred choice by the firms with high growth options rather the call option. We find that the FRNs are generally investment grade with extremely rare presence of a call option. We perform the analysis using Buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the proxy for the long-term stock overperformance/underperformance. A sample of floating rate notes issued (1654) from 1992 to 2007, a period of high interest rates, reveals significant overperformance by the floating rate notes issuing firms in the high-rate paradigm. High growth firms, in the high-rate environment, significantly benefit from the floating rate provision which is less restrictive and less costly than the call option, which typically provides call protection period and pays a call premium. Floating rate provision better mitigates the interest rate risk for the firms in the high-rate environment. We find that the smaller, high growth, higher leverage, less profitable firms with greater agency issues benefit more from issuing FRNs in the high-rate environment. Our study has relevance to the stock portfolio construction and performance. We also perform a comparative analysis using the sample of floating rate notes issued (270) during 2008 to 2018, a period of low interest rates, and find stock underperformance. The implications are that the call option likely is a better choice for the firm since the firm preserves the right to forego exercising the option.

To maximize value, companies must adopt the optimal financial structure. However, identifying this structure is not easy. Literature does not give satisfactory results. To remedy this difficulty, we have sought the optimal financial structure applicable to all companies. Thus, in a new approach by the cost of capital, using modelling, we identify an optimal financial structure model that can neutralize the risk of default of debt:   D/K  with t ? i but t > i.

This study aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on the level of agency conflict and examine the effect of corporate debt levels on the relationship between ownership structure and agency in manufacturing companies which is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). In this study, researchers use two ownership structures, namely family ownership and insider ownership. The ownership structure is measured by the percentage of share ownership by family and insiders. The population of this study is all manufacturing companies listed on the IDX (Indonesian Stock Exchange) from 2017 to 2019. This study uses the purposive sampling technique. This study also has 19 companies with family ownership structures and 21 companies with insider ownership structures as samples. The data analysis technique uses descriptive statistical analysis by SPSS. The results of this study indicate that family ownership and insider ownership have a negative effect on the level of agency conflict in the company. In addition, this study also proves that the level of debt in the company strengthens the relationship between ownership structure and the level of agency conflict.

This study analyzes the effect of capital structure on the performance of telecommunications firms. The firm performance is measured by return on assets while capital structure is proxied with the ratio of debt total assets. Data of telecommunication firm in 62 countries period of year 2010-2020 proceed with a dynamic data panel regression model using the generalized method of moment approach. The empirical results indicated that capital structure of telecommunication firm has significantly impact to the firm performance in developed and developing countries as well as in integrated and wireless telecommunication firms.  The other factors that effect on firm performance are firm size and growth. The novelty of this study lies in the scope of analyses that cover world-wide telecommunication industry based on demographic group (developed and developing countries) and main businesses (integrated and wireless telecommunication).

This study compares Corporate Governance (CG) between Hungary and Indonesia and analyzes the causality between CG and financial performance in both countries. CG proxy is the ownership structure. In the monitoring function, CG will improve the company's performance. The company's performance, on the other hand, can affect the ownership structure as one of the markets for corporate control in the CG mechanism. The causality test will inform whether the monitoring or market for corporate control is implemented as a CG mechanism. This study uses the Granger causality test to analyze the bi-causality between CG and financial performance. The sample consists of companies listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSX) and the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The results showed that only two pairs of bi-causality relationships (out of six pairs) occurred in the BSE sample companies, and there were three pairs of bi-causality relationships (out of nine pairs) in the IDX sample companies. This research contributes to the relationship between ownership and firm performance based on agency problems from the perspective of the monitoring function and the market for firm control.