Analyzing the effect of financial reward, personal cost and reporting channel on whistleblowing intentions utilizing an experimental study
Ni Made Mega Abdi Utami · Gugus Irianto · Yeney Widya Prihatiningtias
International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science · 2020 · Vol. 9 / Issue 2 · 125-132
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Abstract
This study aims to determine the effect of financial rewards (given and not given), personal costs (low and high) and reporting channels (anonymous and non-anonymous) on whistleblowing intentions. This study also analyzes the interaction effects among financial reward and personal cost, financial reward and reporting channel as well as personal cost and reporting channel on whistleblowing intentions. Participants in this study involve 65 finance and accounting employees of state universities in Bali. This research employs a 2x2x2 experimental design. The results of this study indicate that whistleblowing intentions are greater when given financial rewards compared to not given financial rewards, in low personal cost compared with a high personal cost, reported through anonymous reporting channels than in non-anonymous reporting channels. The results of the interaction effect indicate that greater whistleblowing occurs when given a financial reward (case at a low personal cost), through non-anonymous reporting channels. The results also confirm that higher whistleblowing intentions appear in a low personal cost through anonym reporting channels.
Keywords: {'name': 'Financial Rewards'}, {'name': 'Personal Cost'}, {'name': 'Reporting Channel'}, {'name': 'Whistleblowing intention'}
Authors & affiliations
Ni Made Mega Abdi Utami
Affiliation not supplied
Gugus Irianto
Affiliation not supplied
Yeney Widya Prihatiningtias
Affiliation not supplied
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