How do insiders and outsiders affect most Japanese CEOs’ profit manipulation?
Kazuhiko Kobori ORCID ↗
International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science · 2020 · Vol. 9 / Issue 6 · 108-113
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Abstract
This study investigates how insiders and outsiders affect the earnings management of CEOs by conducting a comparative analysis of insiders, trust banks, outsiders, and global investors. Interestingly, the holding shares of insiders and outsiders have opposite effects on CEOs’ opportunistic accounting behaviours.
Keywords: {'name': 'Earnings Management, Insiders, Outsiders'}
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Kazuhiko Kobori
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Deposited references
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