Analyzing supply-side moral hazard behaviors in Botswana's health care market: A qualitative study

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse the behaviours and practices of health care service providers that constitute supply-side abuse of the medical health insurance schemes premised on the notion that patients visit doctors precisely to learn what amount and type of care is medically necessary. Using qualitative methods, individual in-depth interviews were carried on private health service practitioners and thematic analysis via SPSS. The study identifies systemic abuses like overcharging, billing for services not provided, and over prescription. Implication of these findings show that Fee-for-Service Payment Models incentivize providers to deliver more services, leading to potential over-utilization and increased costs in Botswana’s healthcare; due to information asymmetry providers may prioritize quantity over quality of care exploiting patients’ lack of knowledge to recommend unnecessary tests or treatments to maximize on revenue but also costs. On how to minimize supply side moral hazards, the propositions is for pursuance of cost containment strategies to ensure the smooth operation of the schemes like price listings, educate beneficiaries on cost implications and sustainability threats. These propositions can be instituted through an industry led bench-marking, on nationally through regulatory frameworks since moral hazards are an economic cost as inefficiencies brings mis-allocation of resources to enhance the sustainability of medical aid-based health care provisioning.

Keywords: {'name': 'Botswana, Health care service providers, Health insurance, Supply side moral hazard.'}

Authors & affiliations

Lawrence Jambani
Affiliation not supplied

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