A Two-Period Decision Model for Central Bank Digital Currencies and Households
Guizhou Wang · Kjell Hausken
International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies · 2022 · Vol. 11 / Issue 2 · 49-68
Publication metrics
External links open provider records or DOI searches. Provider counts are not combined. Mendeley readership measures saves, not citations.
Dimensions
Live provider badge. If unavailable, use the Dimensions link above.
Observed 21 Oct 2026, 00:21 UTC
Observed 22 Oct 2026 01:37 UTC
Observed 21 Oct 2026 22:03 UTC
OpenAlex and Mendeley observations refresh on article visits, at most once per 24 hours. Unavailable data is not zero. Google Scholar opens a DOI search.
Citations received by this article, grouped by the year of the citing work. Crossref and OpenAlex lifetime totals remain separate in Publication metrics.
2017–2026 Annual history last updated:
Citations received
OpenAlex · year of the citing work
Hover over a year or focus the chart and use arrow keys to inspect values.
2017–2026 annual-history window. 2026 is year to date. Unknown years have gaps.
View data & coverage
2026 is incomplete. Within a successfully fetched ten-year window, omitted years mean zero. Years beyond a saved observation’s window remain unknown (—). Older citations are excluded, so this chart’s sum may differ from the OpenAlex lifetime total. The date above belongs to this annual history; an unsuccessful refresh keeps the previous observation.
Abstract
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) give rise to many possibilities including those of negative interest rates. A two-period decision model is presented between one central bank and one representative household. The central bank applies the Taylor (1993) rule to choose its interest rate. The household allocates its resources strategically to production, consumption, CBDC holding, and non-CBDC holding. The results are determined analytically and illustrated numerically by varying 19 parameter values. Interesting novelties of the article are that the central bank may choose negative CBDC interest rates when the household holds far more CBDC than non-CBDC, for low inflation rates, low real interest rates, low household’s potential production, low weight assigned to inflation in the Taylor (1993) rule, high target inflation rate, and high household’s production parameter. That usually causes the household to decrease its CBDC holding and increase its non-CBDC holding, production and consumption. The central bank may increase its CBDC interest rate to compete with an increasing non-CBDC interest rate if the household’s transaction efficiencies for CBDC and non-CBDC increase, or the household’s transaction efficiency for consumption decreases. Shocks to production, inflation and interest rates are analyzed.
Keywords: {'name': 'Central bank'}, {'name': 'digital currency'}, {'name': 'transaction efficiency'}, {'name': 'decision theory'}, {'name': 'inflation'}, {'name': 'economic shocks'}
Authors & affiliations
Guizhou Wang
Affiliation not supplied
Kjell Hausken
Affiliation not supplied
Deposited references
Supplied references, not a list of publications citing this article.
No reference list supplied.