The Simultaneous Effect Dividend Policy and Debt Policy

Abstract

This study aims to examine dividend policies for companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2018-2022 period. Agency theory argues that dividend policy can reduce agency costs and reduce agency conflicts. The percentage of institutional ownership is used as a proxy for agency costs and can be used as a mechanism for lowering agency conflict. The total sample is 44 companies listed on the IDX. The estimation uses the pooling data method and 3SLS. This research develops a simultaneous system econometric model. This study argues that high institutional ownership leads to higher agency conflict, as management and institutions collaborate to prioritize their interests over other shareholders. Conversely, low institutional ownership leads to disputes between management, low institutional, and public shareholders. The entrenchment argument predicts higher conflict in high institutional ownership, while the convergence argument predicts common agency conflict in common institutional ownership.

Keywords: {'name': 'Agency Costs'}, {'name': 'Institutional Ownership'}, {'name': 'Dividend Policy'}, {'name': 'Debt Policy'}, {'name': 'Entrenchment Arguments'}, {'name': 'Convergence Arguments'}

Authors & affiliations

Esih Jayanti
Affiliation not supplied

Najmudin
Affiliation not supplied

Ika Yustina Rahmawati
Affiliation not supplied

Yuni Utami
Affiliation not supplied

Yulis Maulida Berniz
Affiliation not supplied

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