JOURNAL ARTICLEBo Ouyang · Zenghui Liu · Christine Sun
International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies · 2015
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In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.
DOI 10.20525/ijfbs.v4i4.392 Crossref citations8 OpenAlex citations
JOURNAL ARTICLEShuang Feng · Jon Stewart
International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies · 2015
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The Chinese stock market is an emerging market that has gained much importance over the past few decades. Because of this, it also serves as a great subject for studying market inefficiencies and anomalies. In this paper we provide a review of evidence regarding the development, efficiency and integration of the Chinese stock market. In particular, we review recent literature in the areas of market segmentation, cross-listings and calendar effects. This provides evidence of market inefficiency in China. We also pose questions that can be answered in future studies.
DOI 10.20525/ijfbs.v4i4.362 Crossref citations7 OpenAlex citations
JOURNAL ARTICLEBrian Grinder · Robert Sarikas · Dean Kiefer · Arsen Djatej
International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science · 2015
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Financial crises have regularly afflicted economies throughout history and the United States has been no exception. This paper examines the Panic of 1907, the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression and the Great Recession of 2007-08 and discusses the responses of the government and regulators. The short version of the story is that the while the government response has varied in terms of monetary and fiscal policy, the regulatory response has remained essentially the same. The typical reactive regulation sounds good and gives the appearance of accomplishing something but, in fact, only serves to sow the seeds of future crises. The ineffective implementation of existing regulation has had a similar result. Indeed, several authors note that most financial innovation in recent years has its origins in circumventing new regulations. Likewise, government monetary and fiscal responses may or may not help the economy and often give the appearance of great arbitrariness. Our conclusion is that there will be unforeseen financial crises in the future, sweeping regulation and promises of recent politicians notwithstanding. Serious study of the unanticipated consequences of this regulation and the development of more robust risk management systems will help us mitigate the effects of future crises but will be of little assistance when it comes to avoiding them. Developing the analyses and risk management systems requires a detailed study of financial history keep both successes and failures fresh in our collective memory.
DOI 10.20525/ijrbs.v4i1.271 Crossref citations1 OpenAlex citations