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Pennsylvania's aging transportation infrastructure has long been a cause for concern, with bridges, highways, and other vital components approaching the end of their serviceable lifespans. The state's infrastructure, one of the nation's oldest, is in dire need of repair and replacement, particularly in the case of bridges, many of which are over 50 years old and in poor condition. However, the financial investment required for this task is substantial, posing challenges within the state's budget constraints. To address this infrastructure crisis, an amendment to Pennsylvania's existing legislation, Act 88, is proposed. This amendment would permit local governments to engage in Public-Private Transportation Partnerships (P3s), leveraging private sector financial resources and expertise. Such local government Transportation P3s have the potential to alleviate the state's infrastructure and financial woes. Currently, Act 88 prohibits municipal governments from participating in these partnerships, hindering the Commonwealth's ability to secure private funding and expertise when public resources are limited. This study aims to address the structural deficiencies in Pennsylvania's transportation infrastructure and its $2.2 billion financial deficit, which hampers repair and improvement efforts. The study employs a descriptive, multi-case analysis to investigate how an amendment to Act 88 could enable local municipalities to engage in P3 transportation projects. These partnerships could provide solutions to budgetary and funding challenges, particularly in the context of locally owned bridge repair and replacement projects. The selected cases are evaluated against various performance criteria, such as value, pricing, budgeting, public accountability, regulatory control, and capacity, offering a comprehensive assessment of the potential benefits of local government participation in P3 transportation projects.

In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.