Explore publications.

There have been significant changes in the GATT / WTO system, one of them is its expansion in membership. The regime has up grown from its original 22 founding members to over 140 at the turn of the 20th century. The enlargement has led to the fundamental change in the character of the regime. In the early years the GATT / WTO was perceived of by China as a “Rich Nations’ Club” or “the Club of the Rich,” in which wealthy countries imposed rules on poor and weak developing countries. By the year 2000, the WTO included a majority of developing countries, many of which are among the poorest countries of the world. Furthermore, with the inclusion of China and Russia, the WTO community included all the major nations of the world, even those that were previously uninterested in open trade and thus stayed outside the trade regime. The paper in the above context begins with a brief history of China’s accession to the WTO, including a review of China’s objectives and motivations in joining. It reviews how its entry has supported its substantial growth and further integration into the global economy in terms of trade patterns and other economic indicators such as FDI along with regulations governing IPRs in tune with the WTO obligations. A brief portrait of comparison of Chinese economy with Indian economy is also laid down because both are leading emerging market developing economies — one is the Dragon and the other the Elephant.
  

The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1991 by the Government of India (GoI) made it very clear that the viability of commercial banks is conditioned on their ability to make profits. In a globalized world, the whims and fancies of business cycles govern the fate of banks and a recessionary phase hampers the bank’s ability to pile on the profits thereby increasing their stock of non-performing assets. India, recently, is placed in a very bizarre situation, — some of the renowned banks are reporting huge losses but there is a very limited impact on stock markets. Strategically, the government, however, has taken corrective measures to arrest the growth of non-performing assets (NPAs) of banks. This paper builds upon a time series model capturing the position of NPAs of banks in India (excluding foreign banks operating in India). Empirically, there is a uni-directional causal relationship running from NPAs of banks to growth. Theoretically, what we can conclude is that imposing strict lending norms on banks actually manifests itself into a deeper recession, lowers growth and in turn aggravates the NPA problem further.