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This academic research explores the availability of loan financing to minority-owned businesses and examines a potential relationship between the size of a loan and the characteristics of a business in the USA. It also investigates the possible impact of different characteristics and quantifiable criteria on credit loan denial across different demographic groups. Probit models are used to evaluate the potential existence of racial or ethnic discrimination in the availability and approval of credit. Regression analysis is used to assess the impact that the race of a small business owner has on the relative size of a denied loan, the size of portioned credit, or the size of the company. When other variables suspected of influencing credit approval and rationing are controlled, black-owned and Asian-owned businesses appear to be less likely to be approved for loans and more likely to experience significantly greater credit rationing than their white counterparts.

Effective Market Discipline (MD) puzzles financial economists and regulators for decades, while the recent bail-in legislation for European banks extremely raises the need for even stronger MD. It may not be exaggeration to say that a new regime for the European banking market is born after the aforementioned decision. This paper’s objective is the broader MD examination, using variables that are not usually included in MD studies, but concern the European Union (EU) and the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the last years. In particular, apart from banking, deposit insurance and pure macroeconomic indicators, we also include governance and sovereign debt indices. The new regime may need a new MD approach. We choose Greece to implement our assumptions, because it is the country with the most severe economic, sovereign and governance problems in the EU. We employ data for the period 2002-10. The empirical evidence supports that market discipline is superficial, while there is ample evidence that MD is directly influenced by the poor governance performance and the excessive government debt. Greek authorities have to make major structural reforms in order to create the conditions for long-term stability, while our analysis points out some EMU’s shortfalls.

Banks had a large part in the developments taking place in the years after the outbreak of the crisis in 2007, as many banks had an excessively low capital base, involving too much risk in its businesses. In this study, the largest four banks in Sweden have been investigated. The financial crisis affected the banks differently, depending on the markets of expansion. Excessive risk-taking has been found, where one bank expanded aggressively into new markets and did not appreciate the risks on these new markets. CEO compensation and risk seeking boards are factors that might have caused such behaviour. All of the banks have made noticeable changes to their capital structure, increasing it annually, accompanied by a risk-reduction movement in their assets to improve the stability in most of the banks. The new regulation’s focus on both quality and quantity is in accordance with the views that are expressed in the framework. The banks have altered their goals to levels several per cent above the regulations, in contrast to before the crisis when they were often as close as possible. The impact of the new liquidity regulations has been limited, as the banks continue to work with their internal measures. The banks have all changed their view of capital ratio and liquidity, where many of the banks have doubled the amount of these posts and now find these measures to be both beneficial and a way to gain trust and stability.

The aim of our research is to investigate the relationship between risk management, corporate governance and performance in lending institutions. Mainly, this research seeks to examine the effect of risk management and some board’s features on financial performance. Empirical analyses are conducted from a sample of 17 Tunisian lending institutions over the period 2002-2011 using an OLS regression. The study shows that board size affect performance significantly. Most importantly, the existence of a risk committee within the institution has a negative and significant effect on performance.

This study examines bank competition in the loan markets in India using a new competitiveness index, the Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD). The ARPD quantifies the impact of marginal costs on performance, measured in terms of market shares. The theoretical foundation of the ARPD is robust when compared to other conventional measures. Applying this unbiased competition indicator to loan markets shows that financial reform has contributed to significant improvements in competition. Public sector banks and private sector banks are more competitive than foreign banks too. In addition, we find that the Indian loanmarkets are monopolistic in nature.