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This paper evaluates the performance of road construction contracts awarded by the Roads Authority (RA) of Namibia, addressing the persistent project delays, cost overruns, and contractor non-performance that have continued despite the enactment of the Public Procurement Act 15 of 2015. The study examines three interrelated dimensions of contract performance: the role of procurement processes in contractor selection, the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation systems, and the influence of external factors on project outcomes. A qualitative case study design, underpinned by a constructivist research philosophy, was adopted. Data were collected through semi-structured questionnaires administered to 27 purposively selected participants, comprising 10 Roads Authority procurement officers and project managers and 17 contractors who undertook road projects between 2020 and 2025. Responses were analysed in ATLAS.ti through inductive open, axial, and selective coding, yielding 68 codes consolidated into 19 clusters and five overarching themes. The findings show that contract performance is undermined by (i) procurement process limitations, particularly lowest-bid bias and unverifiable paper-based capacity assessment; (ii) monitoring and supervision gaps linked to understaffing and reactive contract management; (iii) institutional capacity constraints; (iv) external pressures, most notably delayed client payments and political interference; and (v) contractor-side weaknesses including financial mismanagement and capacity misrepresentation. These findings are interpreted through Principal-Agent Theory, the Resource-Based View, and Project Management Theory, which jointly demonstrate that performance failure is multi-causal rather than attributable to any single determinant. The study recommends reforming contractor selection criteria, introducing performance-based contracting, strengthening monitoring capacity through digital systems, and improving payment discipline, offering an empirically grounded contribution to public procurement and infrastructure contract management scholarship in developing countries.

This paper evaluates the performance of road construction contracts awarded by the Roads Authority (RA) of Namibia, addressing the persistent project delays, cost overruns, and contractor non-performance that have continued despite the enactment of the Public Procurement Act 15 of 2015. The study examines three interrelated dimensions of contract performance: the role of procurement processes in contractor selection, the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation systems, and the influence of external factors on project outcomes. A qualitative case study design, underpinned by a constructivist research philosophy, was adopted. Data were collected through semi-structured questionnaires administered to 27 purposively selected participants, comprising 10 Roads Authority procurement officers and project managers and 17 contractors who undertook road projects between 2020 and 2025. Responses were analysed in ATLAS.ti through inductive open, axial, and selective coding, yielding 68 codes consolidated into 19 clusters and five overarching themes. The findings show that contract performance is undermined by (i) procurement process limitations, particularly lowest-bid bias and unverifiable paper-based capacity assessment; (ii) monitoring and supervision gaps linked to understaffing and reactive contract management; (iii) institutional capacity constraints; (iv) external pressures, most notably delayed client payments and political interference; and (v) contractor-side weaknesses including financial mismanagement and capacity misrepresentation. These findings are interpreted through Principal-Agent Theory, the Resource-Based View, and Project Management Theory, which jointly demonstrate that performance failure is multi-causal rather than attributable to any single determinant. The study recommends reforming contractor selection criteria, introducing performance-based contracting, strengthening monitoring capacity through digital systems, and improving payment discipline, offering an empirically grounded contribution to public procurement and infrastructure contract management scholarship in developing countries.