Publication activity
Articles grouped by publication year
Hover over a year or focus the chart and use arrow keys to inspect values.
2026 is year to date. 0 undated publications excluded.
Research across participating journals · All insights follow your collection filters.
Publication activity alongside incoming citations.
Articles grouped by publication year
Hover over a year or focus the chart and use arrow keys to inspect values.
2026 is year to date. 0 undated publications excluded.
OpenAlex · year of the citing work
Hover over a year or focus the chart and use arrow keys to inspect values.
2017–2026 annual-history window. 2026 is year to date. Unknown years have gaps.
Leading affiliations and themes in this collection.
Full distributions & methodology ↓Independent sources. Clear time scales.
Crossref and OpenAlex · separate totals for the same publication cohorts
Hover over a year or focus the chart and use arrow keys to inspect values.
Latest lifetime totals, grouped by the cited article’s year. These are not citations received in that year.
OpenAlex · incoming citation links grouped by citing-work year
Hover over a year or focus the chart and use arrow keys to inspect values.
2017–2026 annual-history window. 2026 is year to date. Unknown years have gaps.
Select journals to compare the same collection filters. Source totals stay separate. These measures describe research activity, not journal quality.
Articles by publication year
Latest lifetime totals · grouped by publication year
Latest lifetime totals · grouped by publication year
By year of the citing work · 2017–2026
2026 is year to date. Crossref and OpenAlex lifetime charts share a citation scale. Unknown observations appear as gaps; known zero stays zero. Annual receipts use available OpenAlex histories and may not sum to lifetime totals. 0 undated publications excluded from publication-year charts.
Crossref citation coverage: 3 / 3 publications (100.0%). Latest observation: 21 Oct 2026, 07:22 UTC. Means and percentages use records with known counts.
DOI-matched OpenAlex observations for the same selected publications. These counts are separate from Crossref and are never added together.
Observation range: 21 Oct 2026 07:22 UTC — 21 Oct 2026 07:23 UTC. Missing matches are not zero citations. Previous observations may remain if a refresh fails or a DOI no longer matches.
OpenAlex affiliations and primary-topic classification. Each publication counts once per institution or country; multi-affiliated publications appear in multiple groups, so percentages can sum above 100%. Countries describe author affiliations, not nationality. Topics use one primary topic per publication.
3 / 3 with data · 0 missing or unmatched. Percentages use all 3 selected publications.
3 / 3 with data · 0 missing or unmatched. Percentages use all 3 selected publications.
3 / 3 with data · 0 missing or unmatched. Percentages use all 3 selected publications.
Citations are the latest recorded totals for articles published in each year, not citations received during that year. Crossref and OpenAlex remain separate and share the same citation scale. 2026 is incomplete; newer articles have had less time to receive citations.
0 undated publications excluded. Unknown citation counts are shown as —, never as zero. Partial coverage can understate totals; expand each table for known / total records.
| Publication year | Journal / scope | Publications | Publications | Crossref known | OpenAlex known |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | All selected publications | 1 | 1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| 2025 | All selected publications | 0 | 0 | 0/0 | 0/0 |
| 2026 | All selected publications | 2 | 2 | 2/2 | 2/2 |
| Publication year | Journal / scope | Crossref citations | Publications | Crossref known | OpenAlex known |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | All selected publications | 2 | 1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| 2025 | All selected publications | — | 0 | 0/0 | 0/0 |
| 2026 | All selected publications | 0 | 2 | 2/2 | 2/2 |
| Publication year | Journal / scope | OpenAlex citations | Publications | Crossref known | OpenAlex known |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | All selected publications | 2 | 1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| 2025 | All selected publications | — | 0 | 0/0 | 0/0 |
| 2026 | All selected publications | 0 | 2 | 2/2 | 2/2 |
Incoming citations to the selected publications, grouped by the year of the citing work. This is separate from lifetime citation totals grouped by the cited article’s publication year.
The publication filters above define which articles receive the citations. The citation-year range below only controls this chart and the incoming-citation comparison. Removing publication-year filters includes older articles’ incoming citations too.
Annual history available for 3 / 3 selected publications. Supported display window: 2017–2026; 2026 is incomplete. Within a successfully fetched ten-year window, omitted years mean zero. Missing histories and years beyond a saved observation’s window remain unknown (—); partial coverage can understate totals.
Annual-history observations (UTC): 2026-10-21T07:22:53.431982+00:00 — 2026-10-21T07:23:09.643675+00:00. Older observations may be retained after failed or incomplete refreshes.
| Citation year | Journal / scope | OpenAlex · Citations received by year | Publications | Annual history known |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2018 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2019 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2020 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2021 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2022 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2023 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2024 | All selected publications | 0 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2025 | All selected publications | 1 | 3 | 3/3 |
| 2026 | All selected publications | 1 | 3 | 3/3 |
Counts represent citation links, not unique citing papers across a journal: one paper citing two selected articles contributes two links. Older citations outside this window are excluded, so annual sums need not equal lifetime totals. OpenAlex methodology ↗
Publications by publication year. 2026 is an incomplete year.
| Period | Publications |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 1 |
| 2026 | 2 |
Latest Crossref totals for the selected publications; not citations received in the selected years.
Unknown counts are excluded from the mean, median and cited-publication rate.
Same filters, source and counting rules across journals. Descriptive statistics, not a quality ranking.
| Journal / publisher | Publications | Crossref citations | OpenAlex citations | OpenAlex coverage | Crossref mean | Crossref median | Crossref cited %* | Crossref coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science SSBFNET | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3/3 | 0.67 | 0 | 33.3 | 3/3 · 100.0% |
* Percentage among publications with a known citation count.
This article aims to place the issue of economic benefits obtained by Russia by military intervention in Syria in the larger perspective of its role as a global player shaping Middle East affairs. The essay aims to answer the following question: How much have Russia's economic interests been impacted by its military involvement in Syria? Russian objectives in Syria extend beyond its geostrategic location to encompass national interests in various strategic areas, particularly maintaining its economic power and bolstering its worldwide influence in Middle Eastern politics. The article will explore the additional advantages that contributed to the expansion of Russian commercial ties in the region, beyond Syria's geostrategic location. This article assumes that Russia is steadily investing in building its influence and creating geo-economic dynamics to boost its economic national interests. The study examines how Russia has been translating its military participation into economic benefits across several sectors, including arms transactions, oil businesses, economic networking, trade facilitation, and resilience. The paper will rely on signed contracts, official papers, reports, menus, speeches, press releases, declaratory statements, and reports on official visits as primary data. This article focuses on the political economy of Russian military involvement in the Syrian crisis to provide detailed insights.
The resumption of indirect US-Iran negotiations in 2026, mediated by Qatar, Pakistan, and Oman, represents a critical test case for contemporary conflict resolution in the Arabian Gulf. While existing studies have extensively examined US-Iran hostility through the lenses of nuclear proliferation, sanctions regimes, and military deterrence, the mediating role of small-state actors, particularly Qatar, remains theoretically underdeveloped. This paper addresses this gap by constructing an analytical framework for understanding Qatar’s mediation strategy in the 2026 shuttle diplomacy efforts, with a specific focus on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and broader de-escalation. Drawing upon mediation theory, neoclassical realism, and hedging literature, the proposed framework conceptualizes Qatari mediation along three analytical dimensions: (1) structural enablers: Qatar’s strategic geography, financial resources, and institutionalized relationships with both Washington and Tehran; (2) strategic motivations: Doha’s pursuit of regional stability, protection of its maritime economic interests, and preservation of its security guarantee from the US while maintaining ties with Iran; and (3) tactical modalities: the indirect, rotating mediation structure involving multiple state intermediaries, draft proposal exchanges, and confidence-building measures. Applying this framework to the 2026 negotiation process reveals two primary findings. First, Qatar’s effectiveness as a mediator hinges on its perceived neutrality and its unique access to both parties’ red lines: the US demand for comprehensive nuclear constraints and Iran’s insistence on sanctions relief and security recognition. Second, the indirect shuttle format, while slower than direct talks, enables both sides to explore compromise without domestic political backlash, transforming the Strait of Hormuz from a flashpoint into a bargaining chip. The paper concludes that Qatar’s mediation, while promising, faces structural limitations inherent to asymmetrical power relations. Ultimately, this framework offers scholars a replicable model for analyzing small-state mediation in great-power conflicts and provides policymakers with insights into the conditions that facilitate or obstruct Gulf diplomacy
The emergence of defense diplomacy is closely tied to the post-Cold War shift in the understanding of international security and related policies. This shift provided a broader perspective on the roles of armed forces, extending beyond their traditional defensive or deterrent functions. In this context, defense diplomacy has been recognized as an effective tool for crisis prevention, enhancing state influence, maintaining regional balance, and strengthening international relations. Over the past two decades, Qatar and Türkiye have cultivated deep and friendly relations, concluding numerous military agreements. These ties were significantly intensified following the signing of a pivotal defense agreement on December 19, 2014, which established a Supreme Strategic Committee. This committee convenes annually to deepen bilateral cooperation. The agreement established a legal framework for enhancing collaboration in areas such as joint defense, military training, and the development of military industries. This research argues that defense cooperation forms the backbone of relations between the two countries, fostering interdependence and strengthening ties across various fields. In 2019, Qatar and Türkiye agreed to further bolster their bilateral relations, signing several agreements in trade, industry, and technology, with a continued strong emphasis on military and defense cooperation. The research concludes that the defense sector is a cornerstone of the growing strategic partnership between Qatar and Türkiye.
The resumption of indirect US-Iran negotiations in 2026, mediated by Qatar, Pakistan, and Oman, represents a critical test case for contemporary conflict resolution in the Arabian Gulf. While existing studies have extensively examined US-Iran hostility through the lenses of nuclear proliferation, sanctions regimes, and military deterrence, the mediating role of small-state actors, particularly Qatar, remains theoretically underdeveloped. This paper addresses this gap by constructing an analytical framework for understanding Qatar’s mediation strategy in the 2026 shuttle diplomacy efforts, with a specific focus on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and broader de-escalation. Drawing upon mediation theory, neoclassical realism, and hedging literature, the proposed framework conceptualizes Qatari mediation along three analytical dimensions: (1) structural enablers: Qatar’s strategic geography, financial resources, and institutionalized relationships with both Washington and Tehran; (2) strategic motivations: Doha’s pursuit of regional stability, protection of its maritime economic interests, and preservation of its security guarantee from the US while maintaining ties with Iran; and (3) tactical modalities: the indirect, rotating mediation structure involving multiple state intermediaries, draft proposal exchanges, and confidence-building measures. Applying this framework to the 2026 negotiation process reveals two primary findings. First, Qatar’s effectiveness as a mediator hinges on its perceived neutrality and its unique access to both parties’ red lines: the US demand for comprehensive nuclear constraints and Iran’s insistence on sanctions relief and security recognition. Second, the indirect shuttle format, while slower than direct talks, enables both sides to explore compromise without domestic political backlash, transforming the Strait of Hormuz from a flashpoint into a bargaining chip. The paper concludes that Qatar’s mediation, while promising, faces structural limitations inherent to asymmetrical power relations. Ultimately, this framework offers scholars a replicable model for analyzing small-state mediation in great-power conflicts and provides policymakers with insights into the conditions that facilitate or obstruct Gulf diplomacy
The emergence of defense diplomacy is closely tied to the post-Cold War shift in the understanding of international security and related policies. This shift provided a broader perspective on the roles of armed forces, extending beyond their traditional defensive or deterrent functions. In this context, defense diplomacy has been recognized as an effective tool for crisis prevention, enhancing state influence, maintaining regional balance, and strengthening international relations. Over the past two decades, Qatar and Türkiye have cultivated deep and friendly relations, concluding numerous military agreements. These ties were significantly intensified following the signing of a pivotal defense agreement on December 19, 2014, which established a Supreme Strategic Committee. This committee convenes annually to deepen bilateral cooperation. The agreement established a legal framework for enhancing collaboration in areas such as joint defense, military training, and the development of military industries. This research argues that defense cooperation forms the backbone of relations between the two countries, fostering interdependence and strengthening ties across various fields. In 2019, Qatar and Türkiye agreed to further bolster their bilateral relations, signing several agreements in trade, industry, and technology, with a continued strong emphasis on military and defense cooperation. The research concludes that the defense sector is a cornerstone of the growing strategic partnership between Qatar and Türkiye.
This article aims to place the issue of economic benefits obtained by Russia by military intervention in Syria in the larger perspective of its role as a global player shaping Middle East affairs. The essay aims to answer the following question: How much have Russia's economic interests been impacted by its military involvement in Syria? Russian objectives in Syria extend beyond its geostrategic location to encompass national interests in various strategic areas, particularly maintaining its economic power and bolstering its worldwide influence in Middle Eastern politics. The article will explore the additional advantages that contributed to the expansion of Russian commercial ties in the region, beyond Syria's geostrategic location. This article assumes that Russia is steadily investing in building its influence and creating geo-economic dynamics to boost its economic national interests. The study examines how Russia has been translating its military participation into economic benefits across several sectors, including arms transactions, oil businesses, economic networking, trade facilitation, and resilience. The paper will rely on signed contracts, official papers, reports, menus, speeches, press releases, declaratory statements, and reports on official visits as primary data. This article focuses on the political economy of Russian military involvement in the Syrian crisis to provide detailed insights.
Source coverage refers to this result set; a publication may occur in several sources. Sync times refer to contributing journals.
Missing abstracts: 0 · Missing authors: 0 · Missing publication dates: 0 · Dates without day precision: 0
| Source | Most recent successful journal sync | Latest attempt |
|---|---|---|
| crossref | 21 Oct 2026 07:22 UTC · ijrbs | complete · ijrbs · 21 Oct 2026 07:22 UTC |
| ojs-rest | 21 Oct 2026 07:22 UTC · ijrbs | complete · ijrbs · 21 Oct 2026 06:46 UTC |
| oai-pmh | 20 Oct 2026 19:55 UTC · ijrbs | complete · ijrbs · 20 Oct 2026 19:50 UTC |
| openalex-enrichment | 21 Oct 2026 07:23 UTC · ijrbs | complete · ijrbs · 21 Oct 2026 07:22 UTC |