Disclosure determinants in corporate reporting: Testing the significance of financial and pension variables
Read abstract
This study investigates the impact of financial and pension factors, including funding ratios, pension accounting modifications, and anticipated future cash flows, on disclosure practices in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Although previous studies have provided significant insights into the correlation among pension variables, corporate attributes, and disclosure levels, empirical information in IFRS jurisdictions is still few. To rectify this deficiency, we examine the factors influencing key actuarial estimate (CAE) disclosures and the actual variations in discount rates and anticipated asset returns, utilising panel data from 173 German companies (DAX, MDAX, SDAX), encompassing 1,057 and 1,352 firm-year observations, respectively. Employing the deferred remuneration theory as a framework, the findings reveal that greater firm size and regulatory status enhance the sensitivity of discount rates and anticipated returns, whereas extensive litigation disclosures diminish both. Profitability is positively correlated with sensitivity, whereas a weaker financed status exerts a mitigating influence. The correlations are most robust and consistent among DAX and MDAX companies, but less so among SDAX companies. The model exhibits a high overall fit, with R² values between 0.38 and 0.72. The results indicate that management of larger, regulated enterprises must be particularly vigilant about the formulation and dissemination of pension-related assumptions, as disclosure decisions can significantly affect market reactions. This study enhances comprehension of the factors and implications of pension assumption disclosures by presenting comparative evidence from significant German indices, thereby proposing practical recommendations for company policy and regulatory supervision. This work theoretically expands the deferred remuneration theory (DRT) by illustrating that the intensity and orientation of compensation–disclosure interactions differ systematically based on firm size, governance structure, and financial attributes. This indicates that the amount and direction of the relationship between remuneration and disclosure are not consistent, contrary to DRT's assumption. Instead, they exhibit consistent variation based on firm size, governance frameworks, and critical financial performance metrics.