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This study aims to examine dividend policies for companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2018-2022 period. Agency theory argues that dividend policy can reduce agency costs and reduce agency conflicts. The percentage of institutional ownership is used as a proxy for agency costs and can be used as a mechanism for lowering agency conflict. The total sample is 44 companies listed on the IDX. The estimation uses the pooling data method and 3SLS. This research develops a simultaneous system econometric model. This study argues that high institutional ownership leads to higher agency conflict, as management and institutions collaborate to prioritize their interests over other shareholders. Conversely, low institutional ownership leads to disputes between management, low institutional, and public shareholders. The entrenchment argument predicts higher conflict in high institutional ownership, while the convergence argument predicts common agency conflict in common institutional ownership.

This study was conducted to see whether there is a difference between mergers and acquisitions on financial performance and firm value or not. A total of 31 companies conducting mergers and acquisitions in 2016-2018 listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange were sampled in this study. The occurrence of decline in profitability, liquidity, activity ratios and firm value as well as an increase in solvency ratios after mergers and acquisitions became the impetus for conducting research. The measuring tool of profitability is Net Profit Margin (NPM). The measuring tool of liquidity is the Current Ratio (CR). The measuring tool of Solvency is the Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER). The measuring tool for the activity ratio is Total Asset Turnover Ratio (TATO). And the instrument for measuring the value of the company is the stock price. This study used the Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test to test the hypothesis. The results showed that there was a difference in the Current Ratio (CR) after the merger and acquisition. However, mergers and acquisitions make no difference in Net Profit Margin (NPM), Total Asset Ratio (TATO), Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER), and Firm value.

The article examined corporate governance's effects on the performance of cement-producing companies in Zambia. Assessing the performance of one of the manufacturing segments of the manufacturing industry because of the effects of corporate governance was detrimental to findings on why there is limited growth in the industry. The study specifically assessed the effects of board size, board independence, CEO duality, multiple directorships, and board tenure on the company's performance. A deductive approach strategy was used, which focused on four leading cement-producing companies in Zambia: Lafarge, Dangote, Sinoma, and Zambezi Portland. A sample population of 150 participants was targeted. Questionnaires collected primary and secondary data from the company’s audited reports. This study used the principal components analysis, correlation, and regression analysis using SPSS version 27. The study found and concluded a positive correlation and effect between multiple directorships and board independence on the company's performance. CEO duality positively impacted the company's performance, but it was not statistically significant. On the other hand, it was concluded and found that board tenure and board size had a negative effect on the company's performance. This implied that they had a reducing impact on the performance of the companies in the cement manufacturing industry. Cement companies should tailor the size of their boards to meet their unique requirements, even though board size and tenure have a negative and statistically significant effect on performance.

The fact that publicly traded companies incur substantial costs when issuing new equity has been extensively documented in the empirical finance literature. In particular, numerous studies show that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) tend to be priced significantly below prevailing market prices, thereby causing issuers to leave money on the table. Offer price discounting is an indirect flotation cost borne by pre-SEO shareholders that, according to extant theoretical and empirical research, arises due to asymmetric information. A heretofore unrelated literature argues that corporate multinationalism, i.e., establishing operations in one or more foreign countries, exacerbates the asymmetric information problem via greater costs to shareholders of monitoring the activities and performance of foreign subsidiaries. Motivated by these lines of thought, I investigate the relation between SEO discounting and corporate multinationalism. Using a sample of SEOs completed by U.S. firms between 1998 and 2016, I show that offer price discounting is significantly higher in offerings conducted by multinational firms relative to those conducted by purely domestic firms after controlling for known determinants of SEO discounts. This effect is stronger for multinational firms with foreign subsidiaries spread across a greater number of countries and weaker for multinationals that hire a high-reputation underwriter to lead the underwriting syndicate. These findings suggest that asymmetric information costs borne by seasoned equity issuers are increasing in the geographic scope of a firm’s operations, which can be mitigated by certification from a highly reputed lead underwriter.

This paper aims to examine the effect of corporate governance (CG) on firm performance (FP). The 3SLS (Three-Stage Least Squares) regressions were performed on a system of equations based on a panel dataset of 1,768 firm-years of Thai-listed companies from 2014 to 2020. This is to assess the simultaneous linear/curvilinear relationships between CG and FP. We found that internal CG mechanisms (i.e., the board size, institutional ownership, and dividend policy) are significantly related to firm performance measured by return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and price-to-book ratio/Tobin’s Q (PBR). Board size exhibits a curvilinear relationship rather than a linear relationship with FP. This reflects the integration between resource dependency theory and stewardship theory. Relative to ROE and ROA, a board size of 10 is optimal (which is associated with a peak ROE of 14.8% and a peak ROA of 3.4%. A board size greater than ten would see a fall in ROE and ROA. Relative to PBR, a board size of 12 is optimal, with a peak PBR of 2.39 times. This study further identifies a ranking of effective CG mechanisms.